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chapter 3
Ontology as Transcendental Philosophy
Huaping Lu-Adler
How does the Critical Kant view ontology? There is no shared scholarly
answer to this question. Norbert Hinske sees in the Critique of Pure Reason
a “farewell to ontology,” albeit one that Kant took a long time to bid
(Hinske 2009). Karl Ameriks has found evidence in Kant’s metaphysics
lectures from the Critical period that he “was unwilling to break away fully
from traditional ontology” (Ameriks 1992, p. 272). Gualtiero Lorini argues
that a decisive break with the tradition of ontology is essential to Kant’s
Critical reform of metaphysics, as is reﬂected in his shift from “ontology”
to “transcendental philosophy,” two notions that Lorini takes to be related
by mere “analogy” (Lorini 2015).1
I agree with Lorini that a thorough reform of ontology is a pivotal part of
Kant’s Critical plan for metaphysics and that ontology somehow “survives
within the critical philosophy” (Lorini 2015, p. 76). To make this case,
however, I deem it important to identify “ontology” with “transcendental
philosophy” in the sense of extensional equivalence. While we can detect
this identiﬁcation in Kant’s writings, only from his metaphysics lectures
can we get a full sense of its historical and philosophical signiﬁcance. In this
chapter I focus on how Kant’s Critical metaphysics represents a deﬁnitive
turn from, as well as notable continuity with, traditional treatments of
ontology, particularly the Wolfﬁan one.
I. The Status of Ontology: A History of Philosophical Problems
Kant refers to “ontology” on two occasions in the ﬁrst Critique. The ﬁrst
reference occurs in the context of a distinction between phenomena and
noumena:
1 For a more detailed analysis of how Kant’s notion of ontology evolved with “transcendental
philosophy,” on the one hand, and “logic,” on the other, from the pre-Critical to the Critical period,
see Ficara (2006).
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[¶1] the proud [stolze] name of an ontology, which arrogates to itself [sich
anmaßt] the offering of synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general in
a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the
modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding. (A247/B303;
modiﬁed translation)
Kant mentions ontology again hundreds of pages later, while discussing the
scope and content of metaphysics. Speculative metaphysics or metaphysics
of nature, which “considers everything insofar as it is . . . on the basis of
a priori concepts,” comprises transcendental philosophy and rational phy-
siology. Of these two parts, Kant says:
[¶2] The former considers only the understanding and reason itself in
a system of all concepts and principles that are related to objects in general,
without assuming objects that would be given (Ontologia); the latter con-
siders nature, i.e., the sum total of given objects. (A845/B873)
If we read these passages along with Kant’s descriptions of transcendental
philosophy and the analytic of pure understanding earlier in theCritique, it
becomes uncertain what he means by “ontology” and how exactly it relates
to “transcendental philosophy.”
The analytic of pure understanding comes down to the “analysis of the
faculty of understanding itself, in order to research the possibility of a priori
concepts by seeking them only in the understanding as their birthplace and
analyzing its pure use in general,” an analysis that is “the proper business of
a transcendental philosophy” (A65–6/B90–1). In that connection, ¶1 points
to a distinction between ontology and transcendental philosophy as two
sciences with different subject matter: while ontology is a system of certain
cognitions of things, transcendental philosophy considers the understanding
in respect of its pure use. But Kant seems to identify transcendental philo-
sophy with ontology in ¶2, although he characterizes “transcendental phi-
losophy” in this passage differently than he did in A12/B25, where it was
introduced as a system of all concepts for cognizing objects “insofar as this
[cognition] is to be possible a priori.”
To resolve this apparent tension between ¶1 and ¶2, one may attach
distinct notions of ontology to them and show how Kant may reject one
while favoring the other. To begin, in ¶1 he is presumably referring to
ontology in the customary sense, which allegedly occupies itself with the
lofty but unwarranted task of providing a system of synthetic a priori
cognitions of things in general (Dingen überhaupt). This task is impossible,
Kant explains, insofar as überhaupt indicates that “abstraction is made from
any condition of sensible intuition as the only one that is possible for us,”
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and that the concepts of pure understanding are therefore used as pure
categories, which however do “not sufﬁce for any synthetic a priori prin-
ciple.” This non-empirical use of categories is “impossible in itself,”
because “the understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more
than to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general” and so “can
never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given
to us” (A246–8/B303–5).
This qualiﬁed rejection of ontology in ¶1 is not an abandonment of
ontology per se, but only signals a ﬁrst step toward clarifying what it should
be. Although it is not immediately clear how ¶2 serves the latter purpose,
the apparent identiﬁcation of ontology with transcendental philosophy is
suggestive. We shall see ample textual evidence for this identiﬁcation
below. In my reading, it epitomizes Kant’s original contribution to the
historical debate about the nature of ontology as a distinct metaphysical
“science” (scientia, Wissenschaftslehre). For starters, let me make four pre-
liminary observations about Kant’s relation to that history, as follows.
1) There was an established practice of describing a metaphysical science
as “transcendental.” JohnDuns Scotus was the ﬁrst to call metaphysics
scientia transcendens, rendering Aristotle’s “meta” as “trans.” Scotus
cites the following statement from Book IV of Aristotle’sMetaphysics:
“There is a science which deals theoretically with being qua being and
with what characterizes it as such.” The transcendentals – the one
(unum), the true (verum) and the perfect/good (bonum) – are what
characterize being qua being and are to be “ﬁrst known.” Metaphysics
is the science that considers these transcendentals.2
Kant is evidently aware of this scholastic tradition.3 In the B edition of
the Critique, having introduced his own “transcendental table of the
categories” (B115), he brings up “yet another chapter in the transcendental
philosophy of the ancients,” which treats concepts that are distinct from
the categories but are counted along with the latter as the “a priori concepts
of objects.”He reports that the scholastics expounded those concepts in the
principle “Quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum” (B113). More recently,
Baumgarten had also explicated a version of this principle, holding that
every being was “transcendentally” one, true and perfect/good (BM, §73, §
89–90, §99–100). These notions now belong in “ontology,” however,
2 Scotus (1997): 7–8. On metaphysics as “transcendental science” in the scholastic tradition, see
Aertsen (2005) and, in greater detail, Aertsen (2012).
3 About the likely scholastic sources of Kant’s notion of the “transcendental,” see Honnefelder (2003).
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which as “the science of the more general predicates of a being” is not
equivalent to metaphysics but is the part thereof called “universal meta-
physics” (BM, §4). As Rudolph Goclenius had already suggested in his
Lexicon philosophicum (1613, Frankfurt), the ﬁrst dictionary referring to
ontology (οντολογία) as the philosophy of being (philosophia de ente), only
this kind of universal science – universal thanks to material abstraction
(abstractio materiae) – is transcendental philosophy (philosophia de . . .
Transcendentibus) and prima philosophia properly so called.4
Kant, then, is not the ﬁrst to identify ontology with transcendental
philosophy. The question is what, if anything, makes his identiﬁcation
special.
2) To establish something as a distinct scientia, one must show that it has
a unique subject. Philosophers before Kant characterized the subject of
ontology variously as, for example, ens, aliquid and nihil, res or some
combination of these. According toMarco Lamanna, when Goclenius
deﬁned ontology as a science of ens universale, the ens in question was
deemed extensionally equivalent with res and aliquid. This view,
Lamanna notes, was integral to the German Schulmetaphysik of the
17th century and was eventually taken up in Wolff ’s ontology,5
deﬁned as “the science of being in general [scientia entis in genere], or
insofar as it is being” (see Wolff 1736, §1; Dp, §73).
Kant alludes to this historical development when contending that the
highest concept of ontology is not “something” (Etwas) or what is
possible, but the “object in general” (Gegenstand überhaupt), which
may in turn be possible or impossible, thing (Ding, aliquid) or nothing
(Unding, nihil), in logical or non-logical senses of these terms.6 It does
not follow, however, that ontology supplies concepts and principles for
“cognition of things in general.” To the contrary, it is “limited to the
much narrower ﬁeld of objects of possible experience” (ÜE, 8:190; my
italicization). Ontology so restricted is the “science . . . which consists in
a system of all concepts of the understanding, and principles, but only so
far as they refer to objects that can be given to the senses.” It is ontology in
this sense that is “called transcendental philosophy” (FM, 20:260; my
italicization).
4 Goclenius (1613, p. 16, 1011). On a few monographic medieval treatises de transcendentibus, see
Aertsen (2012, pp. 32–4). On the early history of “ontology,” see Mora (1963); Devaux and Lamanna
(2009).
5 Lamanna (2014), pp. 147–8. 6 ML2, 28:543; MDoh, 28:622; MK2, 28:711; MMron, 29:811.
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3) When Wolff characterizes ontology as the science that treats that
which is common to and can be predicated of all beings and that is
therefore designated to explain the general notions presupposed by all
other sciences (Dp, §73), he has a standard inventory of such notions
in mind. For the sake of argument, we may sort them into four
divisions: (i) space and time, (ii) concepts listed in Kant’s table of
categories, such as cause, existence, necessity and contingency, and
possibility and impossibility, (iii) what Kant calls “predicables of pure
understanding,” including action and affection, resistance, alternation
and so on, all of which one can ﬁnd in typical “ontological textbooks”
(A82/B108; see Prol, 4:325 n.), and (iv) the three transcendentals
mentioned above. Baumgarten’s ontology includes a similar list of
“predicates of beings,” as we can tell from the Synopsis of his
Metaphysica.
Kant’s ontology has a much more limited list of concepts. He ﬁrst
excludes space and time, assuming that ontology is a science that strictly
includes pure concepts and principles of the understanding. Next, he argues
that his table of categories exhausts all the pure concepts of the under-
standing that are “original” and “primary,” namely all “the true ancestral
concepts of pure understanding” in comparison with which the predicables
are only “derivative” (A80–1/B106–7). As for the three transcendentals,
they are reducible to the categories of quantity: namely unity, plurality and
totality (B114).
Kant needs to make these moves in a principled and non-question-
begging manner, of course. He complains that past searches for the pure
concepts were so “haphazard” that one could not be certain as to why
precisely such and such ones “should inhabit the pure understanding”
(A81/B106–7). This complaint reﬂects a special demand of Kant’s notion
of rational science; namely that we must be able to derive and systematize
its entire content a priori. In order to fulﬁll this requirement, to establish
ontology as a true science, one must ﬁnd a method according to which “the
place of each pure concept of the understanding and the completeness of all
of them together can be determined a priori, which would otherwise
depend upon whim or chance.” Only “transcendental philosophy,” as
Kant deﬁnes it, can meet such a requirement (A67/B92). Turning ontology
into transcendental philosophy in the relevant Kantian sense, then, is
essential to securing its scientiﬁc status.
(4) It was a typical practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to
divide metaphysics into general metaphysics (ontology) and special
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metaphysics. In the Wolfﬁan system, the latter includes cosmology,
psychology and theology, all of which presuppose ontology as
a source of their “principles.” It is in this sense that ontology is truly
the “ﬁrst philosophy” (Dp, §99).
Kant likewise sees ontology as the ﬁrst part of metaphysics, the rest being
“metaphysics proper.” In the Critique, while denouncing “as undone all
attempts made until now to bring about a metaphysics dogmatically,” he
characterizes “metaphysics proper” as that which aims at “extending [rea-
son’s] a priori cognition synthetically.” As a preparation for this end, an
“analytic” is also required: not as a mere analysis of what is contained in the
relevant concepts, however, but as that which “explains how we attain such
concepts a priori in order thereafter to be able to determine their valid use
in regard to the objects of all cognition in general” (B23–4). Accordingly,
“the ﬁrst part of metaphysics” is deﬁned by the task of deducing “concepts
a priori to which the corresponding objects appropriate to them can be
given in experience” and explaining the possibility of cognition a priori by
their means. As for “the second part of metaphysics,” its whole purpose is
to “get beyond the boundaries of possible experience” and make gains in
the “ﬁeld of the supersensible,” a purpose that constitutes “precisely the
most essential occupation of this science” (Bxviii–xxi). Elsewhere, Kant
explicitly calls the ﬁrst part “ontology” and afﬁrms that it “does not
impinge on the supersensible [berührt nicht das Übersinnliche], which is
nevertheless the ﬁnal aim of metaphysics, and thus belongs to the latter
only as a propaedeutic, as the hallway or vestibule of metaphysics proper”
(FM, 20: 261; modiﬁed translation).
Clearly, Kant’s reason for treating ontology as the ﬁrst part of metaphy-
sics is unique. From the Wolfﬁan standpoint, ontology occupies this place
thanks to the generality of its concepts and principles, which are assumed as
valid for all special domains of metaphysical cognitions. To Kant, by
contrast, the relevant sense of ontology must be ontology qua transcen-
dental philosophy, namely as a science of the concepts and principles that
constitute the conditions of what we can cognize a priori (FM, 20:260).
In that connection, he criticizes past metaphysicians for using ontological
concepts and principles to extend theoretical cognitions about the
supersensible.
Now although the supersensible, to which the aim of reason is directed in
metaphysics, is actually no land [Boden] for theoretical cognition, the
metaphysicians still wandered there conﬁdently along the lines
[wanderten . . . an dem Leitfaden . . . getrost fort] of their ontological
58 huaping lu-adler
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/14765165/WORKINGFOLDER/FUGATE/9781107176980C03.3D 59 [53–73] 24.9.2018 6:23PM
principles, which are admittedly a priori in origin, but valid only for objects
of experience. (FM, 20:262; modiﬁed translation)
This passage indicates that, from Kant’s perspective, to determine the
possibility of metaphysics proper it is necessary to begin by examining
the nature of ontology and the boundaries for the valid use of its concepts
and principles. From this examination emerges Kant’s account of ontology
as transcendental philosophy.
Overall, the core issues about ontology concern its status as a “science,”
to establish which onemust identify its unique subject, derive its content in
a way that can ascertain its completeness and clarify its relation to other
parts of metaphysics. Or so Kant would insist, adding that the key to
satisfying these demands is ﬁnding a method by which all the basic onto-
logical concepts and principles can be determined a priori and ordered in
an exact system. To this end, no less than a Copernican “experiment” is
called for, an “altered method of our way of thinking, namely that we can
cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.” For
this method alone “promises to metaphysics the secure course of a science
in its ﬁrst part” (Bxviii). The method is Kant’s famed “critique” of pure
reason, which “consists in that attempt to transform the accepted proce-
dure of metaphysics, undertaking an entire revolution,” with the goal to
“catalog the entire preliminary sketch of a whole system of metaphysics”
(Bxxii–xxiii).
Kant’s conception of ontology as transcendental philosophy is a product
of this transformative work. As an ontology built off the critique of pure
reason, it is directly opposed to an ontology without the critique. This is an
opposition between Critical and dogmatic approaches to ontology. Kant’s
point in the oft-cited “proud name” passage, then, is not so much to bid
farewell to ontology itself as to reject the dogmatic treatment thereof in
order to make room for the Critical one, as is encapsulated in his notion of
ontology qua transcendental philosophy.
This point will become most salient when we examine, as I shall do in
Sections II and III below, Kant’s attempts in the metaphysics lectures to
secure ontology as a true science with an eye to explaining the possibility of
metaphysics proper.
II. Ontology as Kantian Transcendental Philosophy
To Kant, “science” in the strict sense must (a) be systematic, as “a whole of
cognition ordered according to principles,” (b) treat its object “wholly
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according to a priori principles,” and (c) be apodictically certain (MAN, 4:
467–8). In these terms, he assesses whether metaphysics – or any “treat-
ment of the cognitions belonging to the concern of reason” – has got onto
“the secure course of a science” (Bvii). The best metaphysics in existence,
namely Wolff’s, has satisﬁed (a) but failed (b) and (c). On the one hand,
insofar as a scientiﬁc metaphysics must follow “the dogmatic procedure of
reason” and be “carried out systematically in accordance with the strictest
requirement, hence according to scholastic rigor,” Wolff “gave us the ﬁrst
example . . . of the way in which the secure course of a science is to be
taken.” On the other hand, Wolff is guilty of dogmatism in not seeing the
need “to prepare the ﬁeld for [metaphysics] by a critique of . . . pure reason
itself” (Bxxxv–xxxvii).
As for ontology, in Wolff’s view it supplies “certain and immutable
principles” to all other sciences insofar as they are “to be treated demon-
stratively,” including not only such special metaphysics as cosmology and
psychology but also logic and mathematics (Dp, §87–90 and §97–8; Wolff
1736, §9). But whence do we obtain those alleged ontological principles
and how can we ascertain that exactly such and such must be the ﬁrst
principles of human knowledge in general? In other words, what makes
ontology itself a true “science”? To Wolff, scientiﬁc ontology or ontologia
artiﬁcialis is just a reﬂected and distinct representation of the same notions
and principles that constitute ontologia naturalis, which we use commonly,
though only with confused representations thereof (Wolff 1736, §21–3).
In this way, scientiﬁc ontology is ultimately grounded in certain natural
predispositions of the human intellect, which in turn depend on God.
To borrow the terms in whichWolff describes the relation between natural
and artiﬁcial logics, “rules are prescribed [by God to the human intellect],
by which it regulates itself, without understanding them; just as bodies
move by certain rules or laws, and a man, in walking, and in other motions,
observes a set of rules, which he does not understand.” Such rules deter-
mine a universal and “natural aptitude” on our part to cognize things in
a certain way. An artiﬁcial or scientiﬁc account thereof merely “explains, in
a distinct manner, the rules of the natural, and besides, enables us to raise
our natural aptitude to a habit” (Wolff 1754, ch. 16, §3).
Two of Kant’s distinctions indicate how he may respond to this
Wolfﬁan approach. One is between quaestio facti and quaestio iuris regard-
ing pure concepts of the understanding. While the former pertains to the
de facto “possession” of such concepts, the latter concerns the “lawfulness”
or “entitlement” with which they may be referred to objects entirely
a priori (A84–7/B116–19). The other distinction is between an inquiry
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about the possibility of metaphysics “as a natural predisposition [i.e. as
metaphysica naturalis]” and a study of its possibility “as a science.”
The former inquiry is to show that, by “the nature of universal human
reason,” we inevitably pursue questions that deﬁne the aim of metaphysics
and that are to be addressed in special metaphysics beyond the bounds of
experience; e.g. the cosmological question about whether the world has
a beginning. It is thereby left undecided, however, whether human reason
is even capable of giving determinate answers to such questions. Hence, the
possibility of scientiﬁc metaphysics cannot be settled by an appeal to
metaphysica naturalis. A scientiﬁc metaphysics presupposes a critique of
pure reason instead, which is “to determine, completely and securely
[sicher], the domain and the bounds of its attempted use beyond all bounds
of experience” (B21–3).
For Kant, then, obtaining a scientiﬁc ontology cannot be a matter of
gaining clear and distinct representations of certain inborn, though still
obscurely represented rules that determine our natural aptitude. What is
required is rather a critique by which to derive a priori the entire system of
concepts and principles that constitutes ontology, without invoking the
Wolfﬁan notion of ontologia naturalis at all. A Kantian ontology qua
transcendental philosophy is to take shape through such a critique,
which alone can ensure the completeness of its catalog of pure concepts
and demarcate the exact boundaries for their lawful use. Otherwise, an
ontology without the requisite critique, such as the Wolfﬁan ontologia
artiﬁcialis, has “no principle [Princip] . . . whereby the understanding
could be fully surveyed and all of its functions, from which its pure
concepts arise [entspringen], determined exhaustively and with precision”
(Prol, 4:323; see FM, 20:281).
It should come as no surprise, then, that Kant’s remarks about ontology
in his metaphysics lectures manifest an ongoing quest to establish it as
a science, not only by pinpointing its subject and clarifying its relation to
metaphysics proper but also, and indeed most importantly, by seeking the
principle (principium) from which its entire content can be cognized
a priori, with precision and apodictic certainty.7 In what follows,
I examine a few texts to highlight these efforts. I shall give special attention
to how Kant (re-)interprets “ontology” and “transcendental philosophy”
and clariﬁes their relation in the process, until ﬁnally settling on a strict
identity between the two.
7 Note that “principium” chieﬂy means source and foundation, which need not take a propositional
form.
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Before we delve into the representative texts, a few prefatory notes are in
order. To begin, here is the Latin version of Baumgarten’s deﬁnition of
ontology.
Ontologia* (ontosophia, metaphysica, cf. §1 [Metaphysica est scientia pri-
morum in humana cognition principiorum.], metaphysica universalis,
architectonica, philosophia prima) est scientia praedicatorum entis
generaliorum.8
* Die Grund-Wissenschaft. (BM, §4)
This deﬁnition is followed by an explanation of why ontology refers to
(refertur ad) metaphysics: “Entis praedicata generaliora sunt prima cogni-
tionis humanae principia” (BM, §5).9
When Kant talks about his plan to use Baumgarten’s text in the
announcement of his courses for the winter semester 1765–6, he characterizes
ontology as “Wissenschaft von den allgemeinern Eigenschaften aller Dinge”
(NEV, 2:309). In the Metaphysik Herder (c.1762–4), the earliest available
record of Kant’s metaphysics lectures, ontology is deﬁned as “Wissenschaft
von den allgemeinen (generalium) Prädikaten aller Dinge.”As it exhibits the
ﬁrst Grundbegriffe, this science is “the true philosophia prima” and is “for
metaphysics what metaphysics is for philosophy” (MH, 28:7).10
These remarks suggest two things. First, Kant seems to use “Eigenschaft”
and “Prädikat” (the literal German equivalent of “praedicatum”) inter-
changeably while describing the subject matter of ontology. For this
reason, I shall translate “Eigenschaft” as “predicate,” although it is more
commonly rendered as “property.” Second, ontology constitutes the pre-
paratory part of metaphysics in much the same way as metaphysics is the
propaedeutic to the whole of philosophy.
Meanwhile, in some of Kant’s Reﬂexionen dated (though sometimes
uncertainly) from the mid-to-late 1760s, we can see him exploring the
subjective nature of metaphysics itself. Metaphysics is subjective ﬁrst in the
sense that it is “not a philosophy about objects . . . but rather about the
subject, namely, the laws of its reason” (R3716 [before 1764–6? 1764–8?],
17:259). In this way, it is like logic because “in both reason is the object”
(R3939 [1769], 17:356). But metaphysics is also subjective in a sense that
8 “Ontologia* (ontosophia, metaphysica, cf. §1[METAPHYSICS is the science of the ﬁrst principles
in human knowledge.], universal metaphysics, architectonics, ﬁrst philosophy) is the science of the
more general predicates of a being.
*The Fundamental Science.”
9 “The more general predicates of a being are the ﬁrst principles of human knowledge.”
10 On Kant’s conception of metaphysics in the Metaphysics Herder, see Fugate (2015), pp. 65–73.
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logic is not. While logic as “a science . . . of human cognition in general”
treats the subordination of concepts to one another regardless of their
origin, metaphysics is “a science of the fundamental concepts and princi-
ples of human reason” as “the elements out of which all rational [as
opposed to sensible] cognition is composed” (R3946 [1769? 1772???], 17:
359–60; my italicization; see R3949 [1769], 17:361). Logic is objective in
that, by leaving “undetermined the particular nature of human reason,” its
laws are “valid for any reason [gilt vor jeder Vernunft].” By contrast,
metaphysics as a science of pure human reason presents “the universal
concepts that ﬂow from the nature of human reason and their particular
laws” and is to that extent subjective (R3946 [1769? 1772???], 17:360;
modiﬁed translation; see R3952 [1769], 17:362–3).
Kant came to view ontology along similar lines. He wrote: “ontology is
nothing other than a transcendental logic (subjective)” (R4152 [1769–70],
17:436). Ontology is a kind of “logic” as it studies conditions of cognition
that lie with the subject. It is “transcendental” because, as Kant deﬁnes this
notion in the early 1770s, it treats “pure cognition a priori, in which thus no
sensation is given” (R4643 [1772–3], 17:622). It is therefore “subjective” in
a way that logic is not; while the latter presents “the rules of universal
cognition in general,” ontology (as part of metaphysics) investigates “the
particular rules of pure reason” (R4163 [1769–70], 17:440; my italiciza-
tions). This contrast seems to be a precursor to Kant’s distinction between
general logic and transcendental logic in the Critique. One “considers only
the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another, i.e., the form
of thinking in general,” whereas the other presents “the laws of the under-
standing and reason . . . solely insofar as they are related to objects a priori”
and thereby reveals the conditions for “think[ing] objects completely
a priori” (A55–7/B79–82).
Kant’s notion of the “transcendental” c.1770 will turn out to differ in
a crucial respect from the one in the Critique, though. The textual analysis
below will prepare us to appreciate why the difference matters and what it
tells us about the signiﬁcance of Kant’s Critical identiﬁcation of ontology
with transcendental philosophy.
We begin withMetaphysik L1/Heinze (mid-1770s?). Here, metaphysics is
again characterized as a special kind of “logic.” It treats the use of pure
understanding and of pure reason, while logic proper treats the use of
understanding and of reason in general. Insofar as it deals with pure
concepts, metaphysics “must investigate the laws by which the under-
standing can obtain [auf . . . gelangen] such concepts.” This investigation
is assigned to ontology, a pure (as opposed to applied) metaphysics that
Ontology as Transcendental Philosophy 63
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/14765165/WORKINGFOLDER/FUGATE/9781107176980C03.3D 64 [53–73] 24.9.2018 6:23PM
considers “the most general predicates [allgemeinsten Eigenschaften] of
things” and asks about how the understanding may arrive at them.
Ontology so construed denotes the same thing as “transcendental logic”
and has two parts: the “analytic of concepts,” which inspects the concepts
of pure understanding, and “the synthetic part,” which presents the
principles (Grundsätze) that arise from those concepts (ML1, 28:173–4,
185).11
In the Metaphysik Volckmann (1784–5), the Kantian notion of ontology
as a transcendental science gradually takes shape through a broader query
about how metaphysics is possible as a science. The form of a science is its
unity (Einheit), which presupposes an idea of the systematic whole. In that
connection, Kant rejects the customary conception of metaphysics as
a science of the ﬁrst principles of all human cognitions regardless of their
origin. One cannot, he argues, sufﬁciently determine the scope of such
a science. For example, if we do not take the solidity of a body to be
a principle belonging to metaphysics, why not? Where should we stop?
To answer such questions, one must distinguish between cognitions from
a priori principles and those from a posteriori principles. Metaphysics can
only be a “science of pure cognition,” which contains “the principles
a priori of all human cognition.” This science is then divided into pure
and applied parts. The pure part is “a reﬂection about reason itself and not
about the things [Dinge] amenable to reason.” It determines the nature of
our pure reason and the boundaries of its capacity. It can therefore be called
“transcendental philosophy or the critique of pure reason, where pure
reason is its own object [eigen Object].” The applied part “contains the
cognition of the objects of pure reason” and constitutes “metaphysics in the
stricter sense” (MVol, 28:357–61).12
In case you wonder about how ontology ﬁts into this picture and,
especially, how it relates to transcendental philosophy, Kant is mindful
of the need to clarify his position on this issue. In so doing, he indicates
that the very terms “ontology” and “transcendental philosophy” admit
varied deﬁnitions and that his deﬁnitions are substantively different from
the traditional ones. As a result, we see him sometimes prying apart
ontology and transcendental philosophy but at other times equating them.
Kant deems ontology and transcendental philosophy to be distinct from
one another, if the former considers things or objects themselves while the
latter has pure human intellect as its subject.
11 Translations from the Heinze manuscripts used in this chapter are mine.
12 Translations from the Volckmann manuscript used in this chapter are mine.
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One calls ontology a transcendental philosophy, and yet it is the considera-
tion of objects [Gegenstände] through our reason. It is an applied metaphy-
sics [metaphysica applicata], where I treat objects by means of pure principles
of reason. Transcendental philosophy is however self-cognition of our
reason and therefore constitutes an entirely special science. . . . I would
therefore examine my reason with respect to the principles, with respect to
the origin, use, and boundaries, without talking about things [Dingen], . . .
as happens in ontology. (MVol, 28:360–1)
If in the Metaphysik L1 manuscript ontology was designated as transcen-
dental logic, in the Volckmann notes it is transcendental philosophy that is
so designated.
Transcendental philosophy is with regard to metaphysics what logic is with
regard to the whole of philosophy. . . . In respect of the pure use of reason,
a special logic would be necessary, which is called transcendental
philosophy. . . . One could also call transcendental philosophy
a transcendental logic, where we consider not objects but our understanding
itself, where we see what the elements of our pure cognition of reason are,
what its domain [Umfang] and boundaries are, without being concerned
with the object. (MVol, 28:363; also 391)
As a science that is distinct from Kantian transcendental philosophy
(which I hereafter designate “transcendental philosophyK”), ontology
treats “things themselves [Dinge selbst] in accordance with their universal
predicates [Eigenschaften].” I shall call this ontologyTh. This form of
ontology was considered a transcendental philosophy in the scholastic
tradition because the universal predicates in question were supposed to
transcend distinctions among various species of being. But transcendental
philosophyK is transcendental in a different sense. It does not consider
beings at all, but only “the capacity [Vermögen] of our pure reason,
independently of experience, to judge of things” (MVol, 28:363).
Kant’s next move is to argue that the science entitled “ontology,” if it is
to be possible as a science, can only be transcendental philosophyK. Such
a science contains none other than “all the basic concepts [Grund-Begriffe]
and basic propositions [Grund-Sätze] of our a priori cognition in general.”
It will be unﬁtting to call it “ontology” in the original sense of the term
(ontologyTh), which would imply that it had a bare thing (Ding) as such as
its object of investigation. Rather, its proper title is “transcendental philo-
sophy,” meaning a science that “demonstrates how it is possible to cognize
something a priori” by identifying all the a priori elements of our cognition
and determining how far human understanding can go in judging com-
pletely a priori (MVol, 28:391).
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We can see a similar progression toward ontology as transcendental
philosophyK in theMetaphysik Mrongovius (1782–3). Here Kant attacks the
scholastic account of the relation between ontology and transcendental
philosophy from both fronts. On the one hand, noting “the word [‘trans-
cendental philosophy’] has been used and understood as ontology [i.e.
ontologyTh],” Kant complains that “no one has had a true transcendental
philosophy,” the true one being “the science of the principles of pure
understanding and of pure reason.”On the other hand, targeting the notion
of ontology as “the science that deals with the general predicates of all
things,” Kant contends that ontology is possible as a science only if it has
pure cognition as its object (MMron, 29:752, 784; my italicizations). He
reasons:
if it is to consider the properties [Eigenschaften] of all things, then it
[ontologyTh] has as an object nothing but a thing [Ding] in general, . . .
thus no determinate object [Gegenstand]. . . .
. . . the science of all basic concepts and basic propositions upon which all
of our pure cognitions of reason rest is ontology. But this science will not be
properly called ontology [in its literal sense].13 For to have a thing in general
as an object is as much as to have no object and to treat only of a cognition,
as in logic. . . . this science has no object that would be distinguishable from
the essence of reason, but rather it considers understanding and reason
itself, . . . the most ﬁtting name would be transcendental philosophy.
(MMron, 29:784–6)
Ontology qua transcendental philosophy is an ontology secured on the
basis of a critique of pure reason. As such it is opposed to an “ontology
without a critique,” an “ontology that was not a transcendental philoso-
phy,” which could not be a strict science precisely because it lacks the kind
of grounding principle that only the critique can provide (MMron,
29:785).
Notably, Kant seems of two minds about whether ontology is exten-
sionally equivalent to transcendental philosophy or constitutes a proper
part thereof. Sometimes, both possibilities are suggested within the space
of just a couple of paragraphs. In theMetaphysik von Schön (c.1789–91), for
example, Kant introduces ontology following a broad construal of trans-
cendental philosophy. The latter investigates the principles of pure intui-
tion and concepts. It therefore consists of two parts: transcendental
aesthetic and transcendental logic. Both parts are said to “constitute
13 The word “ontology,” in terms of its etymology, “just means the science of beings, or . . . the general
doctrine of being” (ML2, 28:542).
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transcendental philosophy or ontology” or “pure [as opposed to applied]
metaphysics.” A few paragraphs later, however, while summarizing ontol-
ogy as “the system of our pure concepts of the understanding,” Kant seems
to limit its scope to that which is delineated by transcendental logic (MvS,
28:470–4).14
Similarly, in the Metaphysik L2 (c.1790–1), transcendental philosophy is
deﬁned as “the philosophy of principles, of the elements of human cogni-
tion a priori.” Insofar as these principles are divided into those of “a priori
sensibility” (space and time) and those of “intellectual human a priori
cognition” (basic pure intellectual concepts or categories), it includes both
transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic. Ontology, as the ﬁrst
part of metaphysics, “contains the summation of all our pure concepts that
we can have a priori of things.” But the reference to “pure concepts” in this
sentence is not immediately clear. It may refer merely to pure intellectual
concepts, or to space and time in addition, since these are called “concepts”
as well. At the same time, Kant suggests that both transcendental philoso-
phy and ontology may be limited to a system of pure intellectual concepts
and principles: “Transcendental philosophy is the system of all our pure
a priori cognitions; customarily it is called ontology. . . . It embraces all pure
concepts of the understanding and all principles of the understanding or of
reason” (ML2, 28:541–2).
Operative in these texts are two senses of “transcendental philosophy”
that differ in scope. It represents either a broad system of all the basic
elements of our cognition a priori, which include space and time as well as
purely intellectual concepts/principles, or a narrow one that only includes
the latter. If ontology is extensionally equivalent to transcendental philo-
sophy, it may then be taken either in the broad or in the narrow sense.
Alternatively, it may be a system of intellectual concepts/principles that
represents only one part of the broadly construed transcendental
philosophy.
The fact that we can read all these interpretations into Kant’s remarks
about ontology and transcendental philosophy in the aforementioned
lectures is understandable, if we keep in view the relevant historical devel-
opments. As I pointed out in the ﬁrst section of this chapter, when Wolff
and Baumgarten treated ontology as the science that considers the pre-
dicates of being qua being or being in general, they had in mind an
expansive inventory of predicates that included space and time along with
those which Kant would separate out as basic pure intellectual concepts.
14 The translation is mine.
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Kant’s attempt to clarify the nature of ontology as a transcendental philo-
sophy goes hand in hand with his search for a principled way to order all
those supposed predicates in a system where each of them is assigned to its
proper place. He would eventually discover that only a critique of pure
reason can supply the requisite principle for this systematic ordering, and
hence make ontology possible as a science. As he writes,
there is a whole science of sheer pure concepts of the understanding. But the
question arises: how are the a priori cognitions possible? The science that
answers this question is called critique of pure reason. . . . The ﬁrst and most
important question in ontology is: how are a priori cognitions possible?
This question must be solved ﬁrst, for the whole of ontology is based on the
solution of this question. (ML2, 28:541–2; see MDoh, 28:650–1)
The critique in question is distinct from, though intimately tied to,
ontology qua transcendental philosophy. It is “that philosophy which
employs itself with the possibility of the a priori cognitions in our reason,”
whereas transcendental philosophy, “also called ontology,” is “the system of
those cognitions themselves, . . . which contain the elements of pure reason,”
and is “the product of the critique of pure reason” (MK3, 29:949; seeMDoh,
28:617, 679). In this way, the critique is “the complete idea of transcendental
philosophy” but is “not yet this science itself” (A13–14/B27–8). With this
distinction, Kant sometimes divides the critique, not transcendental philo-
sophy, into transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic. As for trans-
cendental philosophy, which “is ontology,” it is the system built on the
twelve “elementary concepts” listed in Kant’s ﬁnal table of categories, con-
cepts that are, to be sure, ﬁrst discovered through the antecedent critique but
that are fully expounded only in ontology/transcendental philosophy itself
(MDoh, 28:651–2, 679).
I take this account of ontology as transcendental philosophy to be Kant’s
ofﬁcial position. The reason why he makes so few references to it in the
Critique is – as he suggests in Metaphysik K2 while explaining the decision
not to adopt the standard expository order of ontology in his published
writings – his concern not to present, not a system of transcendental
philosophy (ontology) as such, but a discussion of the critique presupposed
thereby (MK2, 28:714). After all, putting forward this critique is the most
urgent and pivotal part of Kant’s effort to break away from the old practice
of doing ontology “dogmatically,” without examining the a priori origin of
its concepts or propositions, and to approach it “critically” instead, by
considering how the pure concepts and synthetic a priori propositions
contained therein are possible (MDoh, 28:650–1).
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To put this contrast between dogmatic and Critical approaches to
ontology in perspective, Kant explains in a 1792 letter to J. S. Beck that
the whole science of “ontology as immanent thinking” (i.e. thinking by
means of concepts whose “objective reality . . . can be securely established”)
emerges from his “plans for a system of metaphysics to handle” the
difﬁculty of explaining the possibility of experience in general, by begin-
ning with the categories (Br, 11:313–14). This genesis of ontology as a system
of categories and the associated a priori principles, which can be uncovered
with certainty only through an antecedent critique, at the same time limit
its domain to the objects of possible experience. By Kant’s own account,
this limitation represents his signature contribution to the history of
ontology. We could have spared ourselves from the tedious “editing
[Bearbeitung]” of the system of ontological concepts and principles, he
says, “if only we had borne in mind the rules for [their] right use . . . for
purposes of empirical cognition” (FM, 20:260, modiﬁed translation).
The right use of ontological concepts/principles is the immanent as
opposed to transcendent use, the latter pertaining to the supersensible.
In this restrictive notion of ontology, I shall argue next, lies the key to
understanding Kant’s chief motivation for making it the ﬁrst part of
metaphysics.
III. Ontology and the Possibility of Metaphysics
Above I suggested that, while Kant had already started seeing ontology as
“transcendental” from c.1770, the relevant sense of this term would turn
out to differ signiﬁcantly from his deﬁnition thereof in theCritique. A brief
study of the difference will give us a chance to see that Kant’s critical
treatment of ontology, whereby it is transformed into transcendental
philosophyK, is vital to his greater plan of securingmetaphysics as a science.
For openers, note that the notion of ontology as a system of pure
intellectual concepts has the following implication: Space and time, as
the elements of sensibility a priori, are no longer part of metaphysics. Kant
ﬁrst conﬁrmed this exclusion in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770). There
metaphysics is deﬁned as “the philosophy which contains the ﬁrst princi-
ples of the use of the pure understanding [intellectus],” while the “propae-
deutic science” presupposed thereby explicates the distinction between
sensible and intellectual cognitions. Sensible cognition hinges on space
and time (as principles of sensibility). Intellectual cognition revolves
around pure concepts that are “given by the very nature of the under-
standing” and abstracted “from laws inherent in the mind,” e.g. possibility,
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substance and cause (MSI, 2:393–5; see Br, 10:98). These concepts are said
to have a “dogmatic” end, whereby “the general principles of the pure
understanding, such as are displayed in ontology or in rational psychology,
lead to some paradigm” that serves as a common measure for all other
realities. This paradigm is “noumenal perfection,” conceivable only by
pure intellect (MSI, 2:395–6). It is exactly in this way that the intellectus,
with the concepts drawn from within its own depths, has “real use” (MSI,
2:393, 411).
The working notion of ontology in these remarks is still a far cry
from the Critically rendered one. According to the latter notion, ontol-
ogy is only the propaedeutic part of metaphysics and cannot impinge
upon the supersensible, the latter being the aim of metaphysics proper.
Rather, it is a system of concepts and principles of the understanding
only insofar as they refer to objects of possible experience. Otherwise, an
ontology would be impossible as a system of pure cognitions a priori.
But this was not Kant’s view in around 1770. If he recognized then that
“extremely mistaken conclusions emerge if we apply the basic concepts
of sensibility [space and time] to something that is not at all an object
of sense” (Br, 10:98), he had yet to ﬁnd out the same about the
intellectual concepts that make up ontology. To this end, it would
not be enough to say that these concepts are not sensible but must be
abstracted a priori from certain inherent laws of the mind, or that
ontology is “transcendental logic (subjective)” in the sense I explained
earlier. Rather, as Kant soon came to reckon, he would have to derive
these concepts in a way that could account for their objective validity.
As he described the situation in his famous 1772 letter to Herz,
In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual
representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were
not modiﬁcations of the soul brought about by the object. However,
I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers
to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible. . . . [or]
as to how my understanding may, completely a priori, form for itself
concepts of things with which concepts the facts should necessarily agree.
(Br, 10:130–1)
It is unclear what kind of “objects” are to be represented by the “intellectual
representations” in question. Are they noumena as per the Dissertation, or
phenomena (objects of experience), or both?15 Regardless, one thing will
eventually become clear to Kant. Insofar as ontology is a system of such
15 On controversies over this question, see Allison (2015), pp. 98–100.
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intellectual representations, its prospect as a secure science requires that the
objects be limited to those of possible experience.
Thus, ontology will have to be “transcendental” in a sense that goes
beyond the deﬁnition I mentioned in Section II. If according to the latter
a cognition counts as transcendental just in case it is a priori and no
sensation is mixed therein, Kant now has a more stringent criterion.
As he puts it in the Critique,
not every a priori cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by
means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuition
or concepts) are applied entirely a priori, or are possible . . . Hence . . . only
the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and
the possibility that they can nevertheless be related a priori to objects of
experience can be called transcendental. (A56/B80–1)
Accordingly, if in some of his metaphysics lectures from the mid-1770s
onward Kant continues to treat ontology as either identical to “transcen-
dental logic” or at least presupposing the latter as part of the critique that
undergirds ontology qua transcendental philosophy, he has a new idea of
transcendental logic in mind, which comes from the “expectation” of there
being pure concepts of the understanding that are not of empirical origin
and yet “may be related to objects a priori” (A57/B81).
Understandably, then, part of Kant’s discussions of ontology in those
lectures is the quest for the principle (principium) by which to derive the
concepts of pure understanding in a way that both ensures their complete-
ness and limits their valid use to objects of possible experience. In the
Metaphysik L1 manuscript, for instance, having introduced ontology as
a transcendental logic that investigates the concepts of pure understanding,
Kant highlights two things about those concepts. First, they are “the
transcendental elements of the pure understanding that are deduced [abge-
zogenen] from four functions of judgment,” organized under the headings
of quantity, quality, relation and modality. The resulting “system” of
concepts is guaranteed to be complete and so is preferable to (Aristotle’s
or Baumgarten’s) mere “aggregate” of categories, regarding which “one
could not know whether there were still more.” Second, the concepts and
principles arising from them can only have “immanent” (as opposed to
“transcendent”) use with respect to objects of possible experience, although
in terms of origin they are not drawn from experience (ML1, 28:185–6).16
These two points together deﬁne Kant’s “splendid discovery” of a true
16 See MVol, 28:363–4, 390–92; MvS, 28:471–5; ML2, 28:546–8; MDoh, 28:617, 651–2; MK2, 28:710,
713–4; MK3, 28:823; MMron, 29: 785; MK3, 29:960, 987–8.
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system of the basic concepts and principles of pure understanding (MVol,
28:396).
A reader would be disappointed who wished to search in the lectures for
a substantively more detailed explanation than the one offered in the
Critique of how to map the categories onto speciﬁc logical functions of
judgment. One may nevertheless ﬁnd it instructive to look at how Kant
positions his account of the possibility of pure concepts of the under-
standing vis-à-vis three alternatives: the empiricism represented by
Aristotle and Locke; the Platonist nativism found in Leibniz and
Crusius; and Wolff’s alleged failure to take up the issue in the ﬁrst place.
In so doing, Kant highlights the distinction between quaestio facti and
quaestio iuris about the concepts in question and argues that, to answer the
latter question, those concepts must be treated as acquired originally and
a priori.17 That is, only this original acquisition, through “as it were
a system of the epigenesis of pure reason,” can secure their objective validity
and explain their necessary agreement with experience (B167). In this way,
to explain the possibility of pure concepts of the understanding – an
explanation called “deduction” – is at the same time to prove their validity
(ML2, 28:548).
If the deduction just mentioned is characteristic of ontology qua
transcendental philosophyK, it is also crucial to Kant’s novel take
on the relation between ontology and the rest of metaphysics.
As I mentioned in Section I, he follows the tradition of dividing meta-
physics into ontology and metaphysics proper. But this division now has
a new meaning:
Metaphysics or the system of the pure cognitions of reason divides into two
main sections:
I. Transcendental metaphysics, or that part of metaphysics which
exhibits elementary concepts in order to cognize a priori objects
which can be given: This system of metaphysical cognitions is called
ontology and rests on dissection of reason according to all the
elementary concepts contained in it, e.g., magnitude, quality, sub-
stance, cause, effect, etc.
II. Metaphysics proper <metaphysica propria>, as metaphysics is called when
it is applied to objects themselves. (MK3, 29:956)
Kant also adopts the custom of treating ontology as propaedeutic to
metaphysics proper, but again with his own reasons for doing so. By his
17 MVol, 28:371–80; MvS, 28:466–8; ML2, 28:542; MDoh, 28:618–20; MK3, 29:949–59.
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analysis, the possibility of metaphysics as a science relies on the concepts
supplied by ontology. As he explains, “if there were not [a priori concepts
as are exhibited in ontology], then metaphysics would not at all be possible,”
and it is by virtue of such concepts that “we can expound metaphysics as
a system” (ML2, 28: 546). Here is one way this relation of dependence
plays out:
The objects of ontology can be given in experience and are cognitions of the
understanding. But there are also cognitions of reason, which cannot be
given in experience. These arise from the cognitions of the understanding,
but reason extends them so that they never can be given in experience.
It does this by giving them absolute totality. [We thereby obtain the ideas of
reason for cosmology and theology.] (MMron, 29:875)
Given that the supersensible is the true destiny of metaphysics, the point of
afﬁrming ontology as a transcendental science in the Critical Kantian sense
lies precisely in its propaedeutic status.
Metaphysics is concentrated in the transcendent use of reason, because
the most interesting objects are there, and it ﬁnds no satisfaction in
experience. We would not take the trouble to prove and dissect princi-
ples – and to produce a science [i.e. ontology] – for the sake of the
immanent use of reason unless this seemed to prepare us to climb up to
the ideas. (MMron, 29:767)
This account of the relation between ontology and metaphysics proper,
I hasten to add as a concluding note, also serves to breathe new life into the
Wolfﬁan notions of metaphysica naturalis and metaphysica artiﬁcialis. If the
fact of metaphysica naturalis tells us that human reason inevitably strives
toward the supersensible, only by investigating the possibility ofmetaphysica
artiﬁcialis can we determine to what (if any) extent and by what means the
destined endeavor may be satisﬁed. Establishing ontology as transcendental
philosophyK is the preparatory part of this investigation whereby ontology,
as “the ﬁrst stage of metaphysics,” is restricted to the realm of “objects
knowable to us merely as appearances, not as things-in-themselves” – just
so that human reason can advance toward the supersensible through sub-
sequent stages of metaphysics without the kind of errors that plagued past
systems (FM, 20:286–96; also 316–20, 337–8).
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